Busy

Hello there!

I apologize for not doing anything with this blog for, well, ages. I'm sure all my regular readers (all none of them!) are extremely disappointed. I've been really busy with matters such as dance, coursework, and postgrad apps. I have a lot of thoughts I'd like to express here, but I'm afraid I probably won't have the time until, well, the following summer. On the bright side, I'd like to think I've learnt a considerable amount since I last posted, and I'd like to think I'll learn more by the time I return to this, so expect posts on more than Hume and random pseudo-philosophical musings (areas such as Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics [random musings on my thoughts of what morality is at some point] and Philosophy of Language [maybe on vagueness?] would have been opened up to me by then, hopefully).

At any rate, keep philosophizing,

Qu

Darren says:
just curious, what is the philosophic- POV with respect to intuition?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
intuition of what sort?
Darren says:
In epistemology-
Darren says:
let me rephrase that- what is the value of the statement "it's obviously true"?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
well there're necessary truths
Darren says:
like?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
and there're a priori turths
Darren says:
what's the diff?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like,. 1+1=2 is both necessary and a priori
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
a priori is something knowable without recourse to experience
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
necessary is true in all possible worlds, to use layman's terms
Darren says:
is anything besides math necessary?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
all bachelors are unmarried
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
basically, necessary truths are, by and large, analytic propositions
Darren says:
that's just a definition
Darren says:
is there a distinction?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
analytic propositions are those which are true by definition
Darren says:
ahh
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
between a prior and necessary? some people think so
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
kirpke believed there could be contingent neccessary truths
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like venus is hepserus
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
personally im doubtful
Darren says:
there are examples in math about true statements that cannot be proven
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like?
Darren says:
For any http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consistency_proof formal, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computably_enumerable http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_%28mathematical_logic%29 that proves basic arithmetical truths, an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory, can be constructed. That is, any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete.
Darren says:
culled from WP
Darren says:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
ah, good old Godel
Darren says:
do you guys claim him?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
sorta
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
semi really
Darren says:
cause i don't care what you say, he's bviously a mathematician
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i would have loved to see Russell's face when godel came up with that
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i think it would have been a riot
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
well i think godel is more math and philo, but russell is generally taken by philos
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
*more math than
Darren says:
doesn't that prove a distinction between necessary and a priori?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
how?
Darren says:
it's a statement that's true in all possible worlds, yet not demonstrable?
Darren says:
or am I misunderstanding "without recourse to experience"?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
probably
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
it means able to be grasped without empirical knowledge
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
so to speak
Darren says:
ahh, so all math examples are out
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
or, not based on contingent ideas
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
you get the idea
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
math is pretty much necessary and a priori
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
interestingly, there's a debate on whether math is a synthetic or analytic a priori
Darren says:
in that case, I don't believe there's a distinction between a priori and necessary eihter
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
well, they have different definitions, but there's a tremendous amount of overlap, it has to be said
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like i said, kripke believed there were examples of contingent necessary truths and non-necessary a priori truths
Darren says:
what were his examples?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i think Kant thought the concept of space and time were non-necessary a priori truths
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i think Kripke gave the examples venus is hepserus
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
you know, when people thought there were two stars but realised they were both actually venus
Darren says:
really? how would you come up with a concept of time and space without experiencing time and space?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
arguably you cant understand anything without putting them a priori in a context of space and time, but i digress
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
see, due to kripke's theory of naming, names are rigid designaters
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
so venus is hepserus is empirically found
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
but yet its necessary because both names rigidly designate the same thing
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
his examples generally come on the name/discovery side
Darren says:
that's lame
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
water is H20 was another one i think
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
it sorta makes sense
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i rather like kripke
Darren says:
ok, here's where I'm getting at
Darren says:
are mathematicians infallible?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
he actually published in one of his books that he was too lazy to do a certain project
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
no
Darren says:
how can we be wrong?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
human error?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
oops, 2+2=5?
Darren says:
OK, besides that
Darren says:
let me rephrase
Darren says:
is mathematics infallible?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
why dont you make your point and then we can discuss this
Darren says:
Godel's main significance to mathematicians is that he proved that mathematics, using the axiomatic approach is either incomplete or contradictory
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
poor russell
Darren says:
Incomplete simply means that there are some statements that
Darren says:
we can't determine are true or false
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
yes darren i know what incomplete and inconsistent mean
Darren says:
however, can the stuff that we do know ever be disproven?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
what, disprove 2+2=4?
Darren says:
disprove something that isn't a definition
Darren says:
say the pythagorean theorem
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
erm
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
thats part of the property of a right sided triangle isnt it?
Darren says:
yes
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its contained in the predicates of a triangle
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
the math is just a way of expressing that
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
dont think math can really disprove the pythog theorem
Darren says:
w00t! Infallibility
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
nyeh?
Darren says:
if nothing true in math can ever be proven wrong, are we not infallible?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
how can you prove wrong something that's true?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
discipline notwithstanding
Darren says:
Physicists do it all the time
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like?
Darren says:
Newtonian mechanics
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
they prove wrong something thats accepted, not something thats true
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
isnt it a misnomer to 'prove wrong' something that's true, ie, unable to be proved wrong validly?
Darren says:
that's a pretty rigid definition of truth
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i dont see how you could validly prove something wrong which wasnt't wrong
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
just like you can prove true something that is false
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
*cant
Darren says:
the problem with that definition of truth
Darren says:
is that nothing nonmathematical can be true
Darren says:
sorry, can be known to be true
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
arguably, how can anything be known to be true
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
and its not a complete definition anyway
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its just saying, something true cant be proving to be not true
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
else reductio ab absurdum
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
*ad
Darren says:
I know the pythagoerean theorem to be true
Darren says:
given Euclid's axioms
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
ah, epistemology
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
what a fun topic
Darren says:
haha-
Darren says:
do you know the reason I got turned off philosophy?
Darren says:
There was this one argument that the professor taught against utilitarianism- if utilitarianism is true that harvesting one guy's organs to save 5 guys is morally right
Darren says:
reducto ad absurdum
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
mm?
Darren says:
that got me thinking, why do we assume straightaway that harvesting one guy's organs to save 5 is wrong?
Darren says:
the answer, of course is culture
Darren says:
that's what we are brought up to believe
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
who said its wrong?
Darren says:
that was the argument used against utilitarianism
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
there are more cogent arguments against utilitarianism, and my question was whimsical in any sense
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
there are ways to substantiate the wrongness of the harvesting if one were so inclined though
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
the issues of rights for example
Darren says:
all the same, all arguments in philosophy outside of logic rely on culture
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
then you could argue that rights were cultural
Darren says:
yup
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
or rather a prerequisite of society being formed in any case, if you were more political
Darren says:
is there a way to separate philosophy from cultural bias?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
the point is that is moral philosophy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
analytic philosophy is far less 'cultural'
Darren says:
what is analytic philosophy?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
you sound remarkably like a relativist by the way
Darren says:
relativists don't know what analytic philosophy is?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
no, relativist think everything is relative, cultural, if you will
Darren says:
I don't- that's why I like math
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
math is a bit zzz for me
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
philosophy, now thats incredible
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
following the arguments, forming your own
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
zing zang bam boom
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
you can actually feel the neurons firing
Darren says:
umm... what do you think mathematicians do?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
dunno, i fall asleep when they start explaining
Darren says:
or in fact, all scientists, and humanists and social scientists
Darren says:
following arguments and making them is basically the function of academia
Darren says:
but it's good that you like it though
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
yes, but philosophy is pure in the sense that it doesnt need empirical substantiation in the way science or so does
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
and its free in the way math isnt
Darren says:
with all due respect, that is bullshit
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
how so?
Darren says:
that we are in any way more restrictive than philosophy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
really?
Darren says:
at least good philosophy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
ahhhh
Darren says:
or the analytic kind, from what I gather
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
'good' philosophy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
the fun thing about philosophy is it doesnt have to be good
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
you know how much debate Descartes generates?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its not because his philosophy is good or tenable, far from it
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its for the intellectual exercise
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
people try to defend the cartesian circle
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
people try to show its unescapable
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
to be honest Descartes argument still falls if the circle is broken
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
but thousands of people and millions or words are still spent arguing it
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
and thats why philosophy is more free than math
Darren says:
I see...
Darren says:
whatever floats your boat then
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i guess its a matter of taste
Darren says:
but there's the thing- the subjective part of philosophy isn't free from empiricism
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i couldnt imagine doing math and i dont think you're much for philosophy
Darren says:
the objective part of philisophy is pretty much as restrictive as math
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
well, metaphysics is arguably free from empiricism to an extent
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
and moral philosophy
Darren says:
metaphysics and moral philosophy are influnced by cultural bias
Darren says:
isn't that empirical?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
moral philosophy, possibly, metaphysics though?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
not particularly
Darren says:
give me a statement in metaphysics
Darren says:
I'm a bit unclear what that means
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
metaphysics is basically beyond physics, literally translater
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its the way the world fundamentally is
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
in a way we couldnt possibly claim to know
Darren says:
and that's not empirical?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
hence why epistemologists hate metaphysicians
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
because epistemology is the idea of limits, of what we can know
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
metaphysicians flaunt that and talk about what they couldnt possibly
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
(hence why not dependent on empiricism so much)
Darren says:
haha, that's an interesting distinction
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
me, im more an epistemologist
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i like the idea of limits
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i think Hume once said
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
'does it contain empirical reasoning concerning matters of fact, or does it contain reasoning concerning relations of ideas? No? Cast it to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion'
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
not a fan on metaphysics
Darren says:
haha
Darren says:
I like math because it's pure distilled truth
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
ahh
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i guess we're in it for different things then
Darren says:
yeah, not so much the intellectual excercise for me
Darren says:
I like knowing stuff
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
true stuff i guess
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i just like the way my brain feels when its thinking
Darren says:
pretty much yeah
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its almost a hedonistic enjoyment
Darren says:
do you know Aldous Huxley's definition of an intellectual?
Darren says:
someone who has found something more interesting than sex
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
*snortlaugh*
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i think sadly that might apply to me
Darren says:
I should read Huxley
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
ive realised i dont need a woman as long as i have philosophy
Darren says:
what's that big book of his called again? Brave new world?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
not too sure
Darren says:
we should have these conversations more often
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
they are quite interesting
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i need to ask you about your opinion on something one of these days
Darren says:
I know next to nothing about phil, and you know next to nothing about math, but we still manage to get a good conversation about both
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
is math synthetic a priori or analytic a priori?
Darren says:
what's the difference?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
analytic is true by definition, so to speak
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
synthetic is not
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
Kant thought it was synthetic
Darren says:
what is the alternative to true by definition?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
true, but not by definition?
Darren says:
ahh
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i dunno, true, but not empty i guess
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
Kant though that because, for example, in 2+3=5, the idea of 5 is not contained in either 2 or 3
Darren says:
my gut says it's synthetic, but I haven't had time to explore the question
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i think he's talking bollocks, because 2+3 as a whole necessarily implies 5
Darren says:
5 is defined, mathematically as 4+1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
the idea of 5 isnt contained in 2 or 3, but its contained in 2+3
Darren says:
if he's saying 2+3=4+1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
well 4 is defined as 3+1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
3 is defined as 2+1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
2 is defined as 1+1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
so 5 is defined as 1+1+1+1+1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
and 2 and 3 are defined as 1+1 and 1+1+1
Darren says:
pretty much, but you had to demonstrate that
Darren says:
it took some work
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
hence 2+3 is 1+1+1+1+1
Darren says:
wasn't a straight definition
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
no one said analytic a priori stuff doesnt take work
Darren says:
at least mathematicians won't define it that way
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
sometimes the idea is contained in something but it takes some digging out
Darren says:
hmm...
Darren says:
that makes the question way more interesting
Darren says:
you can divide math into two main branches actually
Darren says:
one is algebra, which basically consists of theorems constructed from axioms
Darren says:
that I believe is completely analytics
Darren says:
*analytic
Darren says:
geometry however-
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
arguably, is geometry math per se?
Darren says:
geometry requires intuition of space and time
Darren says:
it depends if you consider space and time a priori or empirical i guess
Darren says:
what's the phil POV on this?
Darren says:
other than Kant
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
hmm good question
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
some would say empirical
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
although Kant has a huge following
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
i dunno, geometry seems to me another example of relations of ideas
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
a triangle is something by definition
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
3 sides, etc etc
Darren says:
you can axiomatize geometr
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
it has application in the real world, like some math i guess
Darren says:
y
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
yeah
Darren says:
but i do believe that it relies a bit on intuition, unlike algebra
Darren says:
I like algebra way more than geometry
Darren says:
the fact that geometry relies on physical intuition is...
Darren says:
sketchy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
does it though?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
we know geometry through physical stuff, but as an idea it seems to stand alone
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
if the external world did not exist, a triangle would still have 3 sides
Darren says:
would we have a concept of line though?
Darren says:
or point?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
we might not be able to imagine it, but the concept stands independently of the external world
Darren says:
no lines, no points-> no sides
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
it may be epistemologically unattainable but ontologically existing
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
(blergh grammar)
Darren says:
lol
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
arguably we wouldnt know 1 if there wasnt anything to count
Darren says:
actually there was a huge effort in the early 1900s to axiomatize geometry
Darren says:
actually, we define 1 from the empty set
Darren says:
funnily enough, the foundation of all math isn't 1 as most people think
Darren says:
it's the empty set
Darren says:
not zero, mind you
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
well yes, we define it as such, but would we KNOW 1 if there wasnt anything to count?
Darren says:
the empty set
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
its the same as the triangle
Darren says:
we don't have to
Darren says:
we have the empty set
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
we know the triangle through observation, but the idea exists alone
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
how does the empty set generate 1?
Darren says:
if we have the empty set {}
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
we have 1set?
Darren says:
we have the set containing the empty set {{}}
Darren says:
the set containing the empty set has a cardinality 1
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
ahhh
Darren says:
two is defined as "the cardinality of the set containg the empty set and the set containing the empty set"
Darren says:
hence numbers
Darren says:
how do we know the empty set exists?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
just about to say that
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
or more precisely
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
could we know the empty set without an external world?
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
without a concept of space and hence emptiness for example
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
or even the concept of set
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like i said, like geometry it seems to be known through abstraction from the physical world, but yet it exists separately
Darren says:
ok, I give you that then. you're right
Darren says:
I just like to think that we algebraists are superior in some ways to the geometers
Darren says:
it's an ego trip thing
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
like us epistemologists and metaphysicians i guess
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
or everyone and postmodernists
Darren says:
of course, geometers get more props because their work tends to have more applications in physics, engineering etc
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
you're telling me
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
a while back economics was a branhc of philosophy
Qu Hsueh Ming says:
now the bloody economists are making a killing while we're struggling to afford pipe tobacco
Darren says:
LOL

On Synthetic A Priori Knowledge

Does synthetic a priori knowledge exist? Personally, I've never been convinced. I will not deal with an extended discussion on the (very extensive) arguments of either side, but will instead concentrate on a philosopher who I've been reading in the last few days, Descartes.

Descartes himself was not involved in the debate, but the cogito provides an interesting point to ponder. Cogito ergo sum, or 'I think, therefore I am' seems to be fairly straightforward. Thinking that I don't exist is self-contradicting, and hence its converse, thinking that I exist, is necessary. Certainly the cogito does not require any prior experience, so it would seem that it is a priori.

However, although 'I exist' is certainly a contingent fact, I do not think the cogito is in fact a synthetic a priori fact. We have to question what is meant by 'I am' in this sense. Does it mean that I am as I perceive myself right now, typing this out whilst sitting in my room? Certainly not. Does it necessarily mean that I am a being with an enduring identity? Not even that! Does it mean that I am a being which certain thoughts inhere? But then the nature of my 'existence', so confirmed by this argument, is limited solely to the premise. 'I think, therefore I am a being which thoughts inhere', while certainly valid, doesn't really tell us anything beyond the premise. Doesn't 'think' mean just to have thoughts? And therefore isn't the cogito merely analytic in nature, rather than synthetic?

A more interesting question is whether 'I exist' is a synthetic a priori proposition. Certainly anyone who tries to affirm its negation contradicts himself, and thus 'I exist' is necessary whenever asserted by any person. Is 'I exist' then a case of synthetic a priori knowledge?

I am not convinced. This still depends on there being someone to think the thought, as it were. Whereas 'All bachelors are unmarried' is true regardless whether or not there is anyone to think it, as is 'A triangle has three sides' or '1+1=2' (I disagree with Kant that mathematics is synthetic a priori, personally). 'I exist' is only true when thought/asserted by a being, thus it is conditional on its being asserted, which is plainly a contingent fact. Therefore, I feel 'I exist' is hardly a priori.

Well, that's my take on it, anyway.

(By the way, I'm quite busy now that term has started, so I'll likely post quite irregularly.)

On States of Mind

A random thought just occurred to me.

Optimism is seeing the world as better as it is, right? And pessimism is seeing the world as worse than it is.

Thus, someone saying 'I am an optimist' or 'I am a pessimist' is contradicting himself.

See, if he is saying he is an optimist, this means that he believes that he sees the world as better than it is. But that would mean he thinks the world is worse than he claims to see it, and he doesn't really believe the world is that good. The only consistent belief for an optimist or pessimist to hold is that they are a realist.

Meh. It's late and my plane leaves in the morning. So sue me.

On Religion

The history of Philosophy has often been coloured (some might say contaminated) by the subject of Religion. Most of the great thinkers in Europe in the centuries past have been Christians, and have directed at least some of their Philosophy accordingly. Can Religion be 'proved' or even argued for, or is it simply a matter of personal faith, devoid of reason? Let us examine the arguments for Religion, Christianity in particular.

The three main arguments for the existance of God are as follows:

i) The Teleological
ii) The Cosmological argument
iii) The Ontological argument

The Teleological argument, also known as the argument from design, states that the universe contains such complexity that it must have a designer, and based on the goodness and order of the world, this creater must be infinitely good and wise. This is known as the watchmaker argument, based on the analogy that if you find a watch in the desert, you can only assume that someone made it, and the watch did not just 'come to be'.

The Teleological argument has come under heavy fire recently, with evolution showing that complexity can exist from nature. David Hume argued that even if the watchmaker did exist, it is a fallacy to assume he is infinitely perfect. He argued that we can only infer the properties of the Cause from what we know of the Effect, and the universe is neither infinitely good nor infinitely perfect. He proceeds to ask how the conception of a perfect God and the teleological argument sits with the existence of evil. Of course, fundamentalists will feel we brought this on ourselves, Garden of Eden etc, but there are some problems with this 'free will' argument. For example, do angels have free will? If they did not, Lucifer would have to be commanded by God to rebel, thus contradicting the view of a perfect God. If they do, then there are obviously angels who have not fallen, and thus free will is not incompatible with sinning, and thus God could have given us free will and still kept us from falling. (Ex-Christian rant over)

The Cosmological argument basically argues that everything natural, or 'worldly' must have a cause, based on the law of Causation (although Hume might beg to differ). Thus if we follow the chain of causation all the way to the very begining, there must be a 'first cause', which was itself not caused by anything. The argument then proceeds to argue that this 'first cause' (or Unmoved Mover according to Aristotle) must be God, since God self-sufficient in that sense.

This argument assumes that the 'first cause' must be infinitely perfect and provident, but it is clear that this does not have to be the case. There could be a supernatural first cause who created the universe and then left it hung out to dry, as it were.

Personally, I am inclined to believe that an infinite chain of causation could exist. Our limited human minds protest at this because we cannot conceive it, but that does not mean that an infinite regress does not exist. It is plausible that the universe expands until a critical mass, then collapses, leading to another big bang, leading to an expanding universe, and so forth ad infinitum, to name but one possibility.

The Ontological argument states that God is perfect, and existence is a quality of perfection, thus God exists. Anselm asked his listeners to imagine a being than which no greater can be conceived. Now, it would be greater if it existed than if it did not exist, thus it exists.

One response to this is the Kantian dogma that existance is not a predicate, to whit, existence is not a property. Thus a theoretical perfect being would not necessarily exist. To say that X exists is to say nothing more than there is an instance of X. By the Ontological reasoning, I could define a Unicorn as 'a horse with a horn on its head which exists', and thus it would exist.

Also, there is a vital case of referential failure here. In Anselm's version, in the statement that 'it would be greater if it existed', there is no 'it' to refer to here. The argument assumes in its premise that the being than which no greater can be conceived already exists!

Myself, I believe that 'rationalising' religion is self-defeating. If God is provable, what place would faith have? As an agnostic with atheist tendencies, I think that the whole endeavor is misplaced from the start.

On Suicide

I started reading David Hume's 'On Suicide' last night, a work which was certainly controversial upon its publication for that time. Hume basically argues that if suicide is wrong, it is wrong for one of the following three reasons:

1) It is a transgression of our duty to God
2) It is a transgression of our duty to our fellow man
3) It is a transgression of our duty to ourselves

Hume proceeds to argue that suicide is not a transgression of our duty to God. God created the material laws (like gravity, etc) and of the 'animal worlds' (i.e. our senses, passions, memories, judgements etc), and whatever we do within these laws is not a transgression of our duty, provided we do not violate our duty either to ourselves or our fellow man.

Some would say that taking your own life is interfering directly into God's realm: life is something that is God's to give and God's to take. But Hume says that by this argument, we should not make an effort to save ourselves or others from any dangers from the material laws, say if we were sitting and saw a car coming our way at a high speed, we should not make an effort to dive out of the way, because it was God's will that the car should come, and thus God wills to take our life. Furthermore, the death penalty should certainly be abolished by this principle. Life is not ours to take. We should instead imprison felons until God wills to take their lives. We may speed it up with the poor conditions of our prisons, but God has to take the final reap.

Taking one's on life is manipulating the order of God no more than anything we do in this material world, like building a house. Hume draws an analogy:

'It would be no crime in me to divert the Nile or Danube from its course, were I able to affect such purposes. Where then is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channels!' (page 5, On Suicide, David Hume)

Again, Hume says that we are taught to accept the ills of our life through the evils of our enemies as divine Providence, even when they make attempts on my life. Thus taking my own life is as much divine Providence as being assassinated by another, or being mauled by a mountain lion.

In fact, it is blasphemy to think that we, as mere humans, could go against divine Providence, or violate the order of the world! If we attribute everything in our lives to divine Will, we have to do the same to its ending, even by our own hands.

Is suicide then a transgressions of our duty to our fellow man? Hume says that we are not expected to make a small contribution to society at the expense of a large pain to ourselves, and if our suffering be great, then this would outweigh whatever little we could contribute to society. And what more if we are unable to contribute to society! By killing ourselves we would be doing a good thing, by ridding society of its deadweight. Although not so much a problem in Hume's time, overpopulation would certainly spring to mind here.

Is it then a transgression of our duty to ourselves? If we are suffering, certainly not. While progress with a life of misery and pain? In fact, it is our duty to ourselves to alleviate the bane of our life. In his infamous words:

'I believe that no man ever threw away life while it was worth keeping.' (page 10, On Suicide, David Hume)

Is Hume'e assessment correct? I am inclined to agree with Hume's first argument about Providence. Hume was almost certainly an atheist, and this is quite apparent from the way he takes the doctrine of Providence and points out its inconsistency in banning suicide.

However, I feel the reason that suicide should not be practiced is more an expedient one than a moral one. Hume's second and third arguments, in particular, seem rather shaky. A man may have dependents, such as a wife, or children, in which case taking his life is irresponsible to say the least, whatever his emotional state. Also, through taking his own life, a man may hurt those around him deeply. Hume seems to have in mind a man with absolutely nothing left to live for, a parody of a suicidal man if ever there was one.

Which leads me to my next point. Hume says that no man ever took his life while it was worth living. For such a staunch supporter of empiricist backing and evidence, Hume is certainly proved wrong here. How many cases are there of people who commit suicide over something entirely silly, maybe perhaps because of lost love, when love comes and goes? How many cases are there of people who are saved from taking their own lives and come to see their folly and realise that life is in fact worth living? Yes, people may be mistaken in everything they do, but suicide has a finality about it. If I make a mistake in taking my own life, there's no remedying it, there's no do-overs. That's that.

As aforementioned, Hume's idea of a suicidal person seems very much an extreme. The person would have no loved ones and would be in indelible pain from which there is no respite. Hume's arguments would be more suited towards euthanasia (resulting either from extreme physical or emotional pain) than suicide. The reasons against suicide are, in my opinion, more expedient than moral.

So kids, don't kill yourself, however emo you may be.