Does synthetic a priori knowledge exist? Personally, I've never been convinced. I will not deal with an extended discussion on the (very extensive) arguments of either side, but will instead concentrate on a philosopher who I've been reading in the last few days, Descartes.
Descartes himself was not involved in the debate, but the cogito provides an interesting point to ponder. Cogito ergo sum, or 'I think, therefore I am' seems to be fairly straightforward. Thinking that I don't exist is self-contradicting, and hence its converse, thinking that I exist, is necessary. Certainly the cogito does not require any prior experience, so it would seem that it is a priori.
However, although 'I exist' is certainly a contingent fact, I do not think the cogito is in fact a synthetic a priori fact. We have to question what is meant by 'I am' in this sense. Does it mean that I am as I perceive myself right now, typing this out whilst sitting in my room? Certainly not. Does it necessarily mean that I am a being with an enduring identity? Not even that! Does it mean that I am a being which certain thoughts inhere? But then the nature of my 'existence', so confirmed by this argument, is limited solely to the premise. 'I think, therefore I am a being which thoughts inhere', while certainly valid, doesn't really tell us anything beyond the premise. Doesn't 'think' mean just to have thoughts? And therefore isn't the cogito merely analytic in nature, rather than synthetic?
A more interesting question is whether 'I exist' is a synthetic a priori proposition. Certainly anyone who tries to affirm its negation contradicts himself, and thus 'I exist' is necessary whenever asserted by any person. Is 'I exist' then a case of synthetic a priori knowledge?
I am not convinced. This still depends on there being someone to think the thought, as it were. Whereas 'All bachelors are unmarried' is true regardless whether or not there is anyone to think it, as is 'A triangle has three sides' or '1+1=2' (I disagree with Kant that mathematics is synthetic a priori, personally). 'I exist' is only true when thought/asserted by a being, thus it is conditional on its being asserted, which is plainly a contingent fact. Therefore, I feel 'I exist' is hardly a priori.
Well, that's my take on it, anyway.
(By the way, I'm quite busy now that term has started, so I'll likely post quite irregularly.)
Sunday, October 7, 2007
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2 comments:
I don't think I agree with your objection. The idea that "I exist" is contingent upon assertion is the same as claiming that the obviously a priori statement "All bachelors are unmarried" is contingent upon someone assigning meaning to the idea that "bachelor" means an unmarried person. Existence is a necessary aspect of a priori, as is an assignment of meaning to the existence of the assertation.
Just my thoughts! : ]
Hello! I take your point that all 'true' and even 'necessarily true' statements are true based on all sorts of assumptions (even if it is as trivial as a certain meaning being assigned). However, I disagree that the assumption that 'I exist' is asserted is on par with the assumptions that 'bachelor' is assigned the meaning 'unmarried man'. For one, necessary statements are commonly said to be 'true in virtue of their meaning'. While this is clearly true for the bachelors example, it is hardly clear for the 'I exist' example, simply because the fact that assertion isn't part of the meaning of 'I exist'. Of course there is the question of whether it is legitimate to extend necessity to a prioricity here (the two can be different, as Kripke was quick to point out), but I think it too is quite clear that it is hardly a priori knowable that the statement 'I exist' is asserted. Does the fact that we consider the statement 'I exist' from a third person viewpoint mean that it is asserted? I think not; so long as we don't use the indexical 'I' in the appropriate way, assertion does not occur, such as when I consider the statement 'we had lunch', when I consider the we from the third person point of view of my classmates having lunch without me (I guess I'm just not very popular).
Sorry for the long ramble; yours was a very interesting thought, and one I had failed to consider! I guess on the whole, my succint reply would be to say that assertion is not part of the meaning of the indexical 'I', and it is fundamentally the meaning of words or a proposition that may be considered in the a priori, as that would be all we have to go on. An interesting thought, and one I think you were hinting at, is whether necessary statements are true by convention, as Quine opined (see what I did there), in that the assignment of meaning is merely an expression of unrevisability; if I stipulate that bachelor means unmarried man, I mean I am unwilling to consider anything that isn't a unmarried man a bachelor, and this is what is unrevisable in the term 'bachelor'. But that is a thought for another day.
Thanks for your comment!
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